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Abstract
This article discusses the aggregation problem and its implications for eco-
logical economics. The aggregation problem consists of a simple dilemma: when
adding heterogeneous phenomena together, the observer must choose the unit
of analysis. The dilemma is that this choice affects the resulting measurement.
This means that aggregate measurements are dependent on one’s goals, and on
underlying theory. Using simple examples, this article shows how the aggrega-
tion problem complicates tasks such as calculating indexes of aggregate quantity,
and how it undermines attempts to find a singular metric for complex issues such
as sustainability.
Keywords: aggregation; GDP; capital stock; natural capital; sustainability in-
dexes
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1 Introduction
Aggregation — the practice of summing heterogeneous things — is used in all
aspects of science. Aggregation occurs when a physicist sums the mass of many
different particles, or when an ecologist sums the energy consumption of an
ecosystem. The use of aggregation is so commonplace that its epistemology is
often given little thought. This is particularly true in economics — a field that
tends to hide epistemological questions under a fog of mathematics (Mirowski,
1991; Keen, 2001). Aggregation is often portrayed as a purely objective process.
After all what could be more objective than the simple arithmetic act of adding
things up?
The purpose of this article is to show that aggregation, like any act of mea-
surement, is never a purely objective process. This is because underlying every
measurement are assumptions about what is to be quantified, and why the quan-
tification is being made. Giampietro, Allen and Mayumi (2006) call this the
“epistemological predicament associated with purposive quantitative analysis”
— “the observer always affects what is observed when defining the descriptive
domain”. This is another way of saying that no measurement is theory free.
In the natural sciences (particularly physics), the inter-connection between
theory and observation is often undiscussed because there is a consensus that
core theories are correct (and these theories are backed by overwhelming ev-
idence). For instance, if a physicist wants to measure the inertia of a system,
Newton’s laws make it clear that he/she should aggregate the system’s mass.
But when we move into fields like ecological economics that study more com-
plex phenomena, theory is less clear. For instance, what does it mean to measure
‘sustainability’? What is it that is to be sustained? And what are the units of mea-
surement? If ecological economics is to be a “science of sustainability” (Dodds,
1997), then these epistemological questions must be addressed.
This article makes three main points. First, when it comes to aggregation
and objectivity, less is more. When faced with theoretical uncertainties, less ag-
gregation will generally lead to more objective analysis. Second, it is best to
avoid aggregation that uses ‘real’ monetary value. The problem is that numer-
ous subjective decisions must be made when attempting to ‘correct’ for inflation.
Moreover, existing price-index methods (that underpin national accounting sys-
tems) are strongly informed by neoclassical economic theory. If one wishes to
challenge neoclassical theory, then these methods should be avoided. Lastly,
when we aggregate complex phenomena guided by theories that are either un-
clear or contested, we should acknowledge that the resulting measurement con-
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tains an inescapable political element. This likely means abandoning the use of
aggregation to search for ‘optimal’ policy decisions.
2 The Aggregation Problem
Any act of aggregation requires making two types of decisions. First, one must
choose what is to be included in the aggregation and what is to be excluded. This
is often called making boundary decisions. Second, one must choose a method
for converting qualities into quantities. For simplicity, I call this choosing the
‘unit’ of analysis. Note that I mean this in the sense of choosing the conceptual
unit (as in mass), not the literal measurement unit (as in kilograms or pounds).
This article focuses on the ‘unit’ aspect of aggregation analysis, rather than on
boundary decisions. This is because boundary problems have already been ex-
tensively discussed in ecological economics literature. For instance, a common
criticism of aggregate measures of output (i.e. real GDP) is that they do not
include externalities such as environmental degradation or social ‘bads’ (Daly
and Cobb, 1994; Kubiszewski et al., 2013). Similarly, ecological economists
have criticized measures of the capital stock because they do not include the
stock of natural resources, or ‘natural capital’ (Daly, 2011; Dixon and Hamilton,
1996; Costanza and Daly, 1992). While it is important to debate boundary de-
cisions, my aim here is to show that even if there is a consensus on what system
boundaries should be, the act of aggregation still involves subjective (theory-
dependent) decisions about the unit of analysis. Moreover, these subjective de-
cisions affect the measurement itself.
2.1 An Example: Aggregating Apples and Bread
The best way to understand how units affect the aggregation process is through
a simple example. Suppose you are a shopkeeper who has a stock of apples and
bread slices. Like many shopkeepers, you are not satisfied to state that you have
x apples and y slices of bread. Instead, you want to know the size of your total
inventory. How do you go about calculating this quantity?
Let’s set aside the fact that most shopkeepers care about the monetary value
of their stock. (I will deal with monetary value later). Instead, let’s assume that
you are a former natural scientist, and you want a physical measure of the size
of your stock. This is simple enough to do — all that is required is for you to
choose a unit of analysis. Table 1 shows realistic values for the average mass,
volume and energy content of apples and bread slices. You simply choose one of
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these units, and use it to aggregate your total stock. But herein lies the problem.
The choice of units is subjective — it depends on your goals. Yet this choice
plays a crucial role in determining the measurement results.
Table 1: Measuring apples and bread slices using different units
Mass (g) Volume (cm3) Energy (cal)
Apple 75 104 39
Bread Slice 30 52 79
To understand this dilemma, it is helpful to reflect on what a unit does. In
an aggregative analysis, a unit determines the relative weights assigned to the
different elements being added together. In our example, the unit determines
howwe weight apples relative to bread slices. The problem is that different units
lead to different weightings. Using the values in Table 1, we can see that using
mass, volume, or energy leads to the following (different) weightings between
apples and bread slices:
Mass: 1 apple= 2.5 bread slices (1)
Volume: 1 apple= 2.0 bread slices (2)
Energy: 1 apple= 0.5 bread slices (3)
These different weightings can lead to wildly divergent measures for the ag-
gregate stock of apples and bread slices. A clear way to illustrate the problem is
to construct an indexed time series of aggregate quantity (an extremely common
practice in economics). Suppose that over the course of 30 hours, the individ-
ual stock of apples and bread slices changes as shown in Figure 1A. Assuming
that apples and bread slices are uniform, we can objectively state that the stock
of bread slices increases by 164%, while the stock of apples decreases by 70%.
There is no ambiguity here. We would get the same result, no matter what unit
of analysis we choose.
However, this is not true when we move to an aggregate analysis. Figure 1B
shows the results of aggregating the stock of apples and bread slices using units
of energy, volume, andmass (with values from Table 1). Suddenly there is signif-
icant ambiguity in the indexed growth of the aggregate stock. When measured
in terms of caloric energy, the size of our apple-bread stock increases by 86%.
Yet when measured in terms of mass, the same stock appears to decrease in
size by 3%. This large discrepancy occurs because when we change units, we
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Figure 1: Conflicting aggregate measures of a stock of apples and bread
slices
This figure shows how the choice of (conceptual) unit affects aggregate measures of
quantity. We imagine that a shopkeeper has a stock of apples and bread slices. Panel A
shows how the number of apples and bread slices changes over a period of 30 hours.
Panel B shows three different indexed aggregate measures of the same stock, calculated
using units of energy, volume, and mass (with values from Table 1). Different units
lead to a different weighting between apples and bread slices, which causes divergent
measures for the growth of the aggregate stock. Notes: this figure is inspired by Fig.
8.1 in Nitzan and Bichler (2009).
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change the relative weighting between apples and bread slices. This, in turn,
affects how much we weight the increase in the quantity of bread slices against
the decrease in the quantity of apples. Because the different units yield different
apple-to-bread-slice weightings, the resulting indexes of aggregate quantity give
conflicting results.
It might seem reasonable to ask—which of these three indexes is the ‘correct’
measure of aggregate quantity? However this question is ill posed. All three
measures are correct in a strictly mathematical sense. Instead, what we should
ask is — which measurement is appropriate, given our goals and our state of
knowledge? It is here that subjectivity enters the equation. For instance, if we
want to know the scale of our apple-bread stock in the context of feeding a
starving population, caloric energy content seems the most appropriate choice
of unit. But if we wanted to calculate shipping costs, then mass is likely the best
unit. Even when the context makes the choice of the unit seem clear, we need
to remember that the aggregation process depends on a priori decisions about
why we are taking the measurement.
The subjective aspect of aggregation means that in matters where the appro-
priate unit is not clear (or when the unit is contested), aggregate analysis should
be undertaken with caution. For instance, suppose that instead of aggregating
bread and apples, we wanted to aggregate fresh water and bituminous coal to
create an index of ‘natural capital’. It is far from clear what unit of analysis
we should use, since fresh water and bituminous coal have completely different
uses. Given the uncertainty in our goals and theory, the resulting aggregation
would have a great deal of ambiguity. Thus, it is far more reasonable to treat
fresh water and bituminous coal as separate, incommensurable entities. This
disaggregated treatment will be far more objective than any aggregate analysis.
To summarize, aggregation always involves theory-informed choices about
the unit of analysis, and these choices affect the resulting measurement. Given
this epistemological predicament, researchers need to remember that less ag-
gregation means greater objectivity.
3 Monetary Value: The Changing Meter Stick
A defining feature of economics is its focus on prices. This has led to a strong
tendency to conduct aggregate analysis using units of monetary value. Unfor-
tunately, using prices as the unit of analysis leads to its own unique set of prob-
lems. The difficulty is that prices change over time, and attempts to ‘adjust’ for
this change inevitably require subjective decisions.
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When we use prices to measure how aggregate quantities (such as economic
output) change over time, a common belief is that one can objectively account
for price changes simply by adjusting for inflation (using official price indexes).
However, the matter is not so simple. The problem is that price changes are not
uniform. As shown in Figure 2A, historical price changes (in the US) have varied
drastically by commodity. Since 1935, the price of apples increased by a factor
of 50, the price of electricity increased by a factor of 7, and the price of TVs
actually declined (more on this later). This divergent price change means that
our unit is unstable. The effect is the same as when we literally changed units
in our apple-bread example (Fig. 1). Divergent price changes cause the relative
weighting between commodities to change with time. This means that our ag-
gregate measure will be affected by the year in which we chose our prices. This
problem was identified over a century ago by Francis Edgeworth (Edgeworth,
1887):
If one great group of commodities varies pretty uniformly in one direction,
and another in a different direction (or even in the same direction but in a
markedly different degree), then the task of restoring the level of prices can
no longer be regarded as a purely objective ... problem. (cited in Vining and
Elwertowski (1976); emphasis added)
The effect of changing prices can be clearly illustrated by calculating real
GDP using different base years (in which prices are fixed). Figure 2B shows
how the choice of base year affects the growth of US real GDP. This analysis
indicates a 30% uncertainty in the growth of US GDP over the last 60 years.
This range of estimates is conservative because it does not account for other
subjective factors that enter into price adjustments. Most importantly, commodi-
ties themselves change with time. Today’s computers are drastically different
from those of the 1990s. It is standard practice, in price-index methodology, to
differentiate between pure changes in price (inflation) and changes in the qual-
ity of a commodity. For instance, if a computer increases in price by a factor of
2, but at the same time increases in ‘quality’ by a factor of 4, this is recorded as a
decrease in price by a factor of 2. This is why Figure 2A shows such a drastic de-
crease in the price of computers. Virtually all of it is due to quality adjustments.
The same is true of TVs (which have drastically decreased in indexed price since
the advent of smart TVs).
How is this change in quality measured? Here the aggregation problem rears
its head again. In order to measure quality change, we must decompose a com-
modity into individual components, measure the change in quality of these com-
ponents, and then aggregate the result. But what unit should we chose? Non-
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Figure 2: Divergent Price Change
This figure shows how divergent changes in price affect the measurement of US real
GDP. Panel A shows historical price changes in ten selected commodities tracked by
the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Divergent price change means that the choice of base
year has a strong effect on the measurement of real GDP growth, as shown in Panel B.
Methods: in Panel A, some commodities are introduced after 1935 (such as TVs and
computers). For comparison, I index the price of these new commodities to the mean
of the other commodities in the year of introduction. Data for Panel B comes from the
Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, series routputmvqd. Note that the source data
contains real GDP calculations only for years prior to each series’ corresponding base
year. For comparison, I project real GDP growth up to 2017 (for all series). I do this
using growth rates for the 2017 series, less historical differences in mean growth rates
between the 2017 series and the vintage series in question.
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specialists in price-index methodology may be surprised that statistical agencies
use units of utility — the pleasure/satisfaction derived from a product. For in-
stance, when describing the ‘hedonic’ methods used to differentiate changes in
a commodity’s price from changes in quality, the US Bureau of Labor Statistics
writes:
In price index methodology, hedonic quality adjustment has come to
mean the practice of decomposing an item into its constituent charac-
teristics, obtaining estimates of the value of the utility derived from each
characteristic, and using those value estimates to adjust prices when the
quality of a good changes. (BLS, 2010) [emphasis added]
This utilitarian approach is problematic. As Joan Robinson (1962) famously
observed, utility is a circular concept. “Utility”, Robinson writes, “ is the qual-
ity in commodities that makes individuals want to buy them, and the fact that
individuals want to buy commodities shows that they have utility” (emphasis in
original). When we aggregate in units of utility, not only is the choice of unit
subjective, but the very unit itself is impossible to observe (Nitzan and Bichler,
2009). Furthermore, the utilitarian theory of value is an explicitly neoclassical
construct. If ecological economists wish to contest neoclassical theory, then they
need to be aware that existing methods for calculating ‘real’ monetary value are
strongly neoclassical.
I have focused exclusively on an aggregation example (real GDP) where ex-
act market prices are known. My point has been to show that, even when there
is no ambiguity in market value, there is no way to use prices to uncover an
objective ‘real’ quantity. The aggregate analysis still requires subjective, theory-
informed choices that affect the resulting measurement. When we move, as
ecological economists do, to attempting to aggregate the value of things that
have no market price (such as natural capital or social/environmental external-
ities), the problem is even more severe. Often ecological economists use neo-
classical valuation methods (such as contingent valuation) without a discussion
of the underlying problems, and without investigating how alternative methods
would change the results. For a discussion of the problems with neoclassical
valuation, see Diamond and Hausman (1994), Dore (1996), and Eberle and
Hayden (1991).
For those interested in the many problems with using prices to uncover ‘real’
quantities, a good starting point is to revisit the Cambridge capital controversy.
This was a debate in the 1950s and 1960s between economists in Cambridge,
England and Cambridge, Massachusetts over how capital was to be measured.
Joan Robinson (1953) began the debate when she asked — in what units is
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capital measured? This prompted a protracted exchange that culminating in the
Cambridge, England school demonstrating that there is no way to measure the
quantity of capital independently of prices and distribution (Hodgson, 2005).
This finding has important implications for ecological economists who wish
to value non-market phenomena, because it means that any such valuation will
depend on existing prices and the existing distribution of income. If prices (or
the distribution of income) change, then the valuation will change. (For those
interested, Cohen and Harcourt (2003), Felipe and Fisher (2003), and Harcourt
(2015) provide a good summary of the Cambridge debate. For a broader dis-
cussion of the problems with measuring capital see Nitzan and Bichler (2009).
For an extensive review of problems with differentiating between price change
and quantity change, see Nitzan (1992)).
4 The Political Element
When dealing with complex phenomena described by vague or contested the-
ory, there is typically a political element to aggregation, if only in the choice of
unit. Perhaps the best example of a political aggregation decision is the method
for counting state population that was stipulated in the original US constitution.
Early on in the 1787 Constitutional Convention, it was decided that Federal rep-
resentation would be determined by state population. But what was the unit
of population? The infamous ‘Three-Fifths Compromise’ dictated that the unit
would be ‘free persons’, and that slaves would count as three fifths of a free
person. Since slaves could not vote, but were nonetheless counted towards pop-
ulation, the effect was to give free individuals in slave-owning states greater
control over government than their northern counterparts. This allowed South-
ern states to dominate Federal politics during the pre-Civil War era (Addison,
2009; Wills, 2005).
While few examples are as overtly political as this, when we aggregate com-
plex phenomena, the underlying measurement decisions often have political
consequences. For instance, the choice of unit can affect how we view the ‘en-
vironmental impact’ of a technology. Consider recent debates over whether the
diesel engine is more environmentally friendly than the gasoline engine. If ‘en-
vironmental impact’ is measured in terms of carbon emissions, then diesel is the
superior technology. (Diesel engines are more fuel efficient, and therefore emit
less carbon dioxide). However, if ‘environmental impact’ is to be measured in
terms of health-affecting pollutants such as particulate matter or nitrogen ox-
ides, then diesel engines are worse than gasoline engines (Ghose, 2015). Unfor-
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tunately, this is no thought experiment. In an effort to meet Kyoto obligations,
many European countries promoted a rapid switch from gasoline to diesel cars
without a regard for how this would affect air quality (Forrest, 2017). In this
case, the choice of units meant deciding between “killing people today rather
than saving lives tomorrow” (Vidal, 2015).
Environmental decision-making is often characterized by this type of messy
trade-off that has no easy solution. What is troubling is not that measurement
choices have political consequences, but rather, the tendency in economics to
use aggregation to seek optimal solutions to complex problems. Thus economists
have theories for (among other things) optimal taxation (Sandmo, 1976), op-
timal government size (Karras, 1996), optimal economic growth (Koopmans,
1965), and optimal levels of pollution control (Kwerel, 1977). This type of the-
ory has the effect of shutting down debate. After all, it is hard to argue with a
policy that is ‘optimal’.
The problem is that so-called ‘optimal’ solutions are always predicated on
subjective decisions about what is to be optimized (and how it is to be mea-
sured). Without decisions about one’s objective, multidimensional decisions do
not have optimums, they have trade-offs. This can be illustrated by using our ex-
ample of a stock of apples and bread slices. Suppose we need to maximize our
stock by choosing between two scenarios. In Scenario A, we have 3 apples and
2 bread slices, while in Scenario B, we have 2 apples and 3 bread slices. Which
stock is larger? Without further defining our objective, this question has no
meaning. Scenario A and Scenario B involve a trade-off between an additional
apple or an additional bread slice. Since these scenarios are qualitatively differ-
ent, we cannot make a judgment about which situation maximizes the stock.
In order to make such a judgment, we must aggregate the apple-bread stock
into a single metric. Unfortunately, the choice of aggregation unit affects what
we find. As shown in Figure 3, when we aggregate in units of energy, we find
that Scenario A maximizes the apple-bread stock. However, when we aggregate
in units of mass, Scenario B maximizes the stock. Again, this is because the unit
affects the relative weighting between apples and bread slices. As this simple
example illustrates, the appearance of optimality is determined by subjective
decisions used during aggregation. Different decisions will lead to different ‘op-
timal’ solutions.
In a more complex example, suppose when choosing between diesel and
gasoline engines, we use units of lives lost to aggregate the effects of carbon
emissions with the effects of particulate matter. This type of analysis necessarily
involves numerous subjective decisions. For instance, how should we weight
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Figure 3: Conflicting measurements for the maximum stock of apples and
bread slices
This figure shows how the choice of unit affects the choice between two different scenar-
ios (A and B). Which scenario maximizes the apple-bread stock? Our finding depends
on the unit of analysis. When measured in terms of caloric energy (left), Scenario A
maximizes the stock. However, when measured in terms of mass, Scenario B maximizes
the stock. Calculations use values from Table 1.
the immediate (local) deaths from poor air quality against the future (global)
deaths from climate change. And how should we convert chronic illness caused
by pollution into units of lives lost? To convert these heterogeneous qualities
into a single quantity, we must make subjective decisions. Importantly, these
decisions will affect the ‘optimal’ balance between carbon and particulate-matter
emissions.
In my view, seeking ‘optimum’ solutions to complex problems via cost-benefit
analysis is a pernicious use of aggregation. It has the effect of obscuring subjec-
tive trade-offs that are otherwise clearly visible in a disaggregated analysis. This
transforms a political debate into a technical dispute accessible to ‘experts’ only.
But as Ackerman (2008) observes, the problem is not with collecting quantita-
tive data, it is the last step of aggregating everything together:
Most of the information collected for a cost-benefit analysis is useful under
any approach to deliberation. The problems arise only in the final steps of
crunching everything into a single bottom-line number: monetizing nonmon-
etary benefits, discounting future outcomes, and guesstimating the values of
important uncertainties all have the effect of distorting and concealing the
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underlying data.
Thus one possible alternative to cost-benefit analysis is to simply leave in-
formation about environmental impact in disaggregated form, with each aspect
expressed in its ‘natural units’ (i.e. habitat loss in units of area, pollution in
units of mass, lives lost units of individuals, etc.). Stakeholders could interpret
this information as they see fit in order to make a judgment. This would main-
tain a clear separation between objective quantitative analysis and subjective
decision-making.
5 Conclusion
The crux of the aggregation problem is this: when we convert qualitatively dif-
ferent phenomena into a single, aggregate quantity, the qualitative differences
do not just disappear. Instead, these differences become hidden as unexpressed
information. For any given aggregation, what we do not see are the many other
possible ways of converting qualities into quantities. While the aggregation
problem is simple when it is identified, it is often overlooked. Why? A plausible
reason is that when we deal with different phenomena (apples and oranges) in
qualitative terms, most people have an intuitive understanding that a wide vari-
ety of comparisons is possible. But when we convert to a common (quantitative)
unit, it takes a concerted effort to see how the choice of unit affects the analysis.
None of this is to say that aggregation should always be avoided. Without
aggregation, quantitative science would be impossible. Instead, I am suggesting
that the usefulness of an aggregate metric should be judged in relation to the ac-
curacy of the theories on which it is based. In disciplines like physics where core
theories are overwhelmingly confirmed by evidence (and units are meticulously
defined), then aggregation is unproblematic. However, in fields like ecological
economics that deal with complex issues at the forefront of human knowledge,
the matter is different. Here, aggregation may do more harm than good because
underlying theories are often vague, highly contested, and units are poorly de-
fined. The effect may be to give the illusion of quantitative certainty when there
is none. In particular, the search for a single metric of sustainability or a single
metric for environmental impact is likely a fools errand (and it is particularly
pernicious if this metric uses units of monetary value).
If ecological economics is to be a ‘science of sustainability’, then it must take
the aggregation problem seriously. This may mean lowering our expectations
of what can be measured with pure objectivity, and being forthright about the
subjective elements in our aggregate metrics. Alternatively, we can simply assess
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environmental impacts in a disaggregated manner in order to separate objective
measurement from subjective decision-making.
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